The National Arbitration Act: Recent Decisions and Erie R.R. v. Tompkins by Lightsey, Harry M., Jr.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 12 Issue 2 Article 3 
1960 
The National Arbitration Act: Recent Decisions and Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins 
Harry M. Lightsey Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Harry M. Lightsey Jr., The National Arbitration Act: Recent Decisions and Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 12 S.C.L.R. 
345. (1960). 
This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
LAW NOTES
THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION ACT:
RECENT DECISIONS AND ERIE R.R. v. TOMPKINS
One of the more conspicuous developments in modern law
has been the tendency to avoid formal judicial procedures
in the settlement of disputes. An outstanding example of this
trend may be found in the multiplicity of governmental quasi-
legislative administrative agencies. Another facet of this
movement appears in the increased emphasis upon the arbi-
tration of disputes. Such arbitration has undergone vigorous
development in two general fields: (1) the disposition of
labor disputes through arbitration, and (2) the settlement of
disakreements arising from the performance of contracts,
generally kiown as "commercial arbitration". This note will
deal with the latter problem, examining some of the current
problems in the field of commercial arbitration, and empha-
sizing the interrelationship between the federal and state law
in the field. The arbitration of labor disagreements is touched
on only for purposes of analogy, and no atempt will be made
to deal with factors prompting the movement away from tra-
ditional judicial processes for settling disputes.
There are two common types of contract arbitration agree-
ments: (1) clauses providing for settlement by arbitration
of future disputes arising between the parties to a contract,
and (2) agreements for the submission of existing contro-
versies under a contract to arbitration.1 When a contracting
party, subject to either of these types of agreement, refuses
to arbitrate, the courts are faced with the problem of whether
the agreement should be enforced. In both types, the courts
have been conspicuously hostile - possibly, it is said, because
of an instinctive desire to preserve their traditional juris-
dictions.2 Thus, the common-law rule, both in this country and
in England, is that a bargain to arbitrate will not be spe-
1. Sturges & Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitra-
tion Under the United States Arbitration 'Act, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
581 (1952).
2. Id. 581-582, n. 2, "Common law revocability and non-enforceability
have been ruled -into such agreements in almost all American jurisdic-
tions ... 1"; cf, Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. -Amtorg Trading Corp.,
126 F. 2d 978, 982 (2d Cir. 1942).
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cifically enforced, and that only nominal damages are avail-
able for its breach.
3
In an attempt to avoid the harshness of the common law
rule, many jurisdictions have enacted statutes which in some
degree overcome the problem of the revocability and non-en-
forceability of contractual arbitration agreements. 4 Of these,
the most significant is the United States Arbitration Act,
originally enacted by Congress in 1925. 5 The Act must, of
course, be considered as a unit in order to be properly evalu-
ated. Sections 2 and 3, however, are the hub of the Act and
have presented the greatest difficulties.
Section 2 of the Act provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to per-
form the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract.0
Section 3 of the Act provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts
of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitra-
tion under an agreement in writing for such arbitration,
the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satis-
fied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is
3. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §550 (1932), "A bargain to arbitrate,
though it is not illegal, is practically unenforceable unless it is made a
condition (see §151), since the bargain gives rise to neither a right to
substantial damages nor a right to specific performance."
4. Idaho, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South
Dakota have statutes dealing with this area of the law. Colorado and
Washington by judicial decision have disallowed common law revoca-
bility. Pennsylvania has denied revocability, at least where arbiters are
named in the agreement. England has a statute which allows specific
performance in virtually all cases. California, Connecticut, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin have statutes declaring
at least certain classes of arbitration agreements enforceable and irre-
vocable.
5. 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C. §§1-15 (1946); Legislative re-
ports on the Act may be found at Committee Report 96, accompanying
H. R. Rep. No. 646, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) ; H. R. Rep. No. 96
and Sen. Rep. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). The Act was repealed
and reenacted in 1947, 61 STAT. 669 (1947), 9 U. S. C. §§1-14 (1954).
6. 9 U. S. C. §2 (1954).
[Vol. 12
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referable to arbitation under such an agreement, shall
on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant
for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such ar-
bitration. 7
The history of litigation over these sections reveals the two
chief problem areas. The first arises in cases present in the
federal courts because of diverse citizenship of the litigants,
since the court must decide whether to apply federal or local
law under the doctrine enunciated in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.8
The second problem involves the extent and effect of the pro-
visions of the Act.9 This note discusses only the first prob-
lem, emphasizing the impact of the recent cases of Robert
Lawrence Co., Inc. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.10 and Bern-
hardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc.'I
7. 9 U. S. C. §3 (1954).
8. 304 U. S. 64 (1938) ; cf. Kochery, The Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements in the Federal Courts: Erie v. Tompkins, 39 CORN. L. Q.
74,78 (1953).
9. Sturges & Murphy, op. cit. supra note 1.
10. 271 F. 2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959). Briefly, the facts of the case may
be stated as follows: Plaintiff sues for damages alleging that the de-
fendant made fraudulent misrepresentations which induced the plain-
tiff to purchase and pay for a quantity of wool fabric. The defendant;
after receiving the plaintiff's order, issued a confirmation that was
different from the order in several respects. After a postponement, de-
livery was made to the plaintiff who accepted and paid for the goods.
Plaintiff alleges that certain latent defects were subsequently dis-
covered and attempts to rescind the contract and collect damages. Both
the plaintiff's order and the defendant's confirmation contained a com-
prehensive arbitration clause. The defendant moved for a stay of pro-
ceedings and for the submission of the disagreement to arbitration
under the terms of the contract. The District Court denied this motion.
HELD: Reversed. As applied to commerce and maritime transactions,
the federal Arbitration Act creates national substantive law which con-
trols over local law and requires the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments by the courts. Petition for cert. filed, 28 U. S. L. WEEx (Feb. 2,
1960).
11. 350 U. S. 198 (1956). Bernhardt involved a contract of employ-
ment which contained a clause referring to arbitration any dispute be-
tween the parties. Petitioner subsequently brought an action for dam-
ages in a Vermont state court for his discharge under the contract. Re-
spondent removed the case to the Vermont federal district court which
had jurisdiction because of the diverse citizenship of the parties. Respond-
ent's motion for a stay pending arbitration was refused, the court hold-
ing that Vermont law (which makes an executory arbitration agree-
ment freely revocable) governed the case under Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.
The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court in an 8-1 de-
cision reversed the Court of Appeals. Speaking for six justices, jMr.
Justice Douglas initially ruled that the contract did not evidence a
"maritime transaction" or a "transaction involving commerce" under
Section 2, and that Section 3 was inapplicable since it applied only to
the types of transactions enumerated in Section 2. He then held that
arbitration in diversity suits is not merely a procedural matter gov-
3
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In Lawrence,12 the court once again faced a consistently
troublesome question, i.e., whether the determination of the
submission of contested contracts to arbitration under pre-
vious agreement of the parties is controlled by federal or
state law. This question has previously been regarded as in-
separable from the Erie doctrine,' 3 as extended in subsequent
cases, 14 that where federal court jurisdiction rests solely on
diversity, the court must apply the substantive law of the
state. For many years, the federal courts had escaped the
limitations of this doctrine by treating the enforcement of
arbitration agreements as a procedural matter, thus, con-
trolled by the law of the forum."5 In the 1956 Bernhardt de-
cision,'0 the Supreme Court disposed of a phase of'this con-
troversy by holding that, where jurisdiction rests solely on
diversity and the contested agreement is not one involving
interstate commerce or a maritime transaction under Sec-
tion 2 of the Arbitration Act, the Erie doctrine does apply.
This holding rests on the broad proposition that diversity
based proceedings in federal courts should not lead to sub-
stantially different results from those which would have been
reached had the cases been brought in the proper state court.'
7
Submission of a contract to arbitration, the Court said, suffi-
ciently affected the outcome to make the matter one of "sub-
erned by the law of the forum (i.e., the federal court), but that be-
cause it "substantially affects the cause of action created by the state"
so that "the outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where
the suit is brought", state law must govern. The Court concluded that
Vermont law clearly made arbitration agreements unenforceable, and
therefore, did not remand on that point; however, a conflict of laws
was remitted to the district court. Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion agreed that the Erie rule dictated the Court's holding, since
there would otherwise be a. "serious question of constitutional law" if
cases grounded solely on diversity are subject to federal arbitration
law, For this reason he would construe the Act as inapplicable to di-
versity actions, meantime abstain from any consideration of (the Acts)
p rovsins in cases which are in federal courts "on a jurisdictional basis
other than diversity of citizenship". Dissenting Justice Burton thought
arbitration was a procedural matter and that Erie did not apply.
12. 271 F. 2d. 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
13. 304 U. S. 64 (1939).
14. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945); Angel v. Bul-
lington, 330 U. S. 183 (1947).
15. California Prune & Apricot Growers' Ass'n. v. Catz American
Co., 60 F. 2d 788 (9th Cir. 1932); Lappe v. Wilcox, 14 F. 2d 861 (N. D.
N. Y. 1926); For an excellent discussion of cases in this area, see
Kochery, op. cit. supra note 8.
16. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U. S. 183 (1956).
17. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
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stance" within the Erie doctrine,18 thus requiring applica-
tion of state law.
Bernhardt, however, left open important questions relating
to the enforcement of arbitration agreements affecting com-
merce and maritime transactions. It is in this area that the
Lawrence case is important.19 The question may be simplified
into two basic concepts. If the Arbitration Act merely es-
tablished court procedure to enforce a state-created right to
compel arbitration, then it is applicable only as a matter of
procedure and, even in contracts involving commerce or mari-
time transactions where federal courts have jurisdiction
based solely on diversity, Erie dictates that the substantive
state law should be applied.20 On the other hand, if the Arbi-
tration Act creates a new body of federal substantive law rela-
tive to arbitration agreements affecting commerce or mari-
time transactions, then in such cases, the Act would be con-
trolling and independent of state law. The Lawrence decision
resolves the question in favor of the latter position.21
In arriving at the conclusion that the Arbitration Act cre-
ates a new body of federal substantive law, the Court relies
upon the language of the Act 22 as well as its legislative his-
tory.23 The court finds that the limitations of the Act in Sec.
2 indicate a congressional intention to rely upon the ad.
18. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the Bernhardt
case notes that the categories of "substance" and "procedure" are, in
relation to Erie v. Tompkins, less than self-defining. He agrees with the
majority that the question of arbitration goes sufficiently to the merits
of the outcome to make the matter one of "substance" under the Erie
doctrine. See note 11. 350 U. S. 198 (1956).
19. 271 F. 2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
20. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U. S. 183 (1956).
21. 271 F. 2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), "We, therefore, find federal law as
derived from the Arbitration Act to be controlling." at p. 409.
22. See note 5 supra.
23. See note 5 supra; "As introduced into Congress section 2 of the
Act provided for the validity and enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments in any contract or maritime transaction or transaction involving
commerce. The Senate Committee struck the word 'contract' from
the section and rewrote the language in its present form, so as to
cover only maritime transactions and transactions involving inter-
state and foreign commerce. Senate Report No. 536, 68th Congress,
Zip M tg. Co. -. Pep Mfg. Co., D. C. 44 F. 2d 184. This was evidently
done because it was realized that Congress had no power to legislate
with respect to the validity of contracts generally but only as to the
validity of those which related to matters subject to its control." Agos-
tini Bros. Building Corp. v. United States, 142 F. 2d 856 (4th Cir.
1944); Compare, International Union United Furniture Workers v.
Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F. 2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948); See also
Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F. 2d 3, 5 (3rd Cir. 1943).
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miralty24 and commerce 5 powers granted to Congress by the
Constitution. It finds additional support for this position in
the construction given to the Arbitration Act in the Bern-
hardt case.26 Pointing to the jealousy with which the courts
have looked upon arbitration agreements in the past, and
their attempts to thwart this encroachment upon what they
termed their "jurisdiction", the Court draws the inference
that the Arbitration Act is an attempt by Congress to re-
move this hostility of the judiciary and to make the benefits
of arbitration available to the business world, at least insofar
as their power would legitimately enable them to accomplish
this result.
27
The Court is driven into rejecting earlier holdings in sev-
eral federal jurisdictions which reason that the Arbitration
Act pertains to remedies and, thus, is procedural only and
within the exception to the Erie doctrine,28 by the Bernhardt
decision which rejects this rationale. The Court, however,
seeks to sustain a broad enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments under the Act, and in so doing, it advances beyond the
artificial rationale of the former rule and rests its decision
upon the more logical reasoning that, as applied to commerce
and maritime transactions, the Act creates national substan-
tive law which encompasses questions of the validity, revoc-
ability, and enforceability of arbitration agreements.
29
In reaching this decision, the Lawrence case may be in con-
flict with the earlier decision of Ross v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp.30 The Ross case states that ".... even if this
contract is the sort contemplated by Section 3 of Title 9, the
interpretation of the contract is still a matter of California
law .. ." and that Bernhardt dictates that result. Accord-
ingly, the Court "examined the contract and the law of Cali-
fornia to determine whether this contract presents an en-
24. U. S. CONST. art. III, clause 2.
25. U. S. CONST. art. I, section 8, clause 3.
26. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, 271 F. 2d 402 (2d Cir.
1959).
27. Ibid.
28. See note 15, su2ra; the related theory that arbitration is a remedy
and thus not subject to the Erie rule apparently stems from the con-
curring opinion of Justice Cardozo in Meachom v. Jamestown Frank-
lyn & Clearfield Ry., 211 N. Y. 346, 105 N. E. 653 (1914); cf. Red Cross
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109 (1924). See, however, later
cases rejecting this reasoning: Ross v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 236 F. 2d 632 (9th Cir. 1956); Jackson v. Atlantic City Electric
Co., 144 F. Supp. 551 (D. N. J. 1956).
29. Robert Lawrence Co. case, supra note 21.
30. 236 F. 2d 632 (9th Cir. 1956).
350 [Vol. 12
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forceable agreement to arbitrate."3' While Lawrence takes
this case to be in conflict with its decision,3 2 this result does
not necessarily follow. A close reading of the statement from
Ross leads to the conclusion that the Court turned to state
law only for the interpretation of the contract. The unfortu-
nate language relating this rule to the Bernhardt decision, and
later to the "enforceable agreement to arbitrate", is mislead-
ing. The Ross holding may be taken to mean that the federal
court will apply state law in interpreting a contract to deter-
mine if there is or is not an agreement to arbitrate, but that
if there is such an agreement to arbitrate, the federal court
will enforce the agreement under the Act. This result is, of
course, not necessarily in conflict with Lawrence.
The possible conflict between Lawrence and Ross, however,
points up difficult problems that may arise in accepting the
Lawrence rationale. First of all, application of the Arbitra-
tion Act in a case where jurisdiction is based solely upon di-
versity is contrary to Justice Frankfurter's concurring opin-
ion in Bernhardt which suggests that, in view of delicate con-
stitutional questions, the Act should not be interpreted as
governing diversity actions.3 3 With deference to this re-
spected and influential view, it was not adopted by Justice
Douglas' opinion for a majority of the Court, and is, thus,
not controlling *against the Lawrence holding. Initially, it is
hard to justify the position that such a broad and sweeping
determination should rest upon finely drawn inference and
interpretation. It is apparent, in the light of the expanded
definitions placed upon the powers of Congress in the field
of commerce,34 tha this decision will have far reaching con-
sequences in the related areas of state law. Because much of
the litigation which could be removed to the federal courts be-
cause of diversity will fall within the expanded concept of
transactions involving commerce, under the Lawrence reason-
ing the federal courts may have relatively few occasions to
give effect to state law in diversity cases.
31. Ibid.
32. 271 F. 2d 402, note 7 ait 409, "We think the court in Ross V.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, 9 Cir., 1956, 236 F. 2d 632,
misconstrued Bernhardt when it held that the contract in that case,
which involved commerce, was required by the Bernhardt reasoning to
be interpreted according to California law."
33. See note 18 supra.
34. See: Wickard v. F.ilburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942); American Power
and Light Co. v. Securities Exchange Commission, 329 U. S. 90 (1946);
Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219
(1948).
19601
7
Lightsey: The National Arbitration Act: Recent Decisions and Erie R.R. v. T
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
A curious anomaly is thus presented. While federal sub-
stantive law applies in diversity-based cases in the federal
court (including those removed from state courts), state law
presumably would continue to apply to those cases where re-
moval to federal courts is precluded by lack of complete di-
versity or inadequate jurisdictional amount. It may be argued
that if the Erie rationale strives for uniform results in fed-
eral diversity and state cases, this desirable result is defeated
under Lawrence. Of course, if complete diversity or the
requisite jurisdictional amount is lacking, the parties have no
occasion to "select" a forum to obtain a result, since the fed-
eral forum is unavailable. This does not eliminate the diffi-
culty that contradictory legal doctrines may be applied in fact
situations identical except for the accidental factors barring
recourse to federal courts.
There is little or no basis for the sweeping argument that
the Arbitration Act of its own force was intended to supplant
state law in state courts, and it is doubtful whether such an
intent should be inferred from the Act. Thus, in cases where
both state and federal forums are available to litigants, the
law which will be applied will depend upon the forum utilized.
It is also significant, as Judge Medina states, that the Act
has generally been considered as furnishing no independent
basis for federal jurisdiction.8 5 It seems reasonable to pre-
sume that if Congress had intended to negate in large part
the law of many states, it would have explicitly declared that
the assertion or denial of those rights was a sufficient basis
for the invocation of federal jurisdiction.86
The Bernhardt decision, together with the earlier case of
Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal,37 may in-
dicate a disposition to apply state law in the field of commer-
cial arbitration, as distinguished from labor arbitration where
the Supreme Court recently found in the Taft-Hartley Act
a Congressional purpose to create a federal substantive law
35. "It is interesting to note that though new substantive federal
rights were created, suits involving the application of the Arbitration
Act do not furnish an independent basis of federal jurisdiction under
28 U. S. C. section 1331." Robert Lawrence Co., Inc. v. Devonshire Fab-
rics, Inc., supra; citing Kraus Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Brassert &
Sons, Inc., 62 F. 2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1933); In re Warner, 31 F. 2d 283
(2d Cir. 1929); and others.
36. See for example: LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 61 STAT.
156, 29 U. S. C. 185 (1947).
37. 345 U. S. 653 (1953).
[Vol. 12
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of arbitration.3 8 It is therefore open to question whether the
court should hold in commercial arbitration cases that the Act
creates new substantive law in contracts involving commerce
or maritime transactions. Such an approach becomes uncer-
tain and difficult in the absence of an expressed Congres-
sional intent to create sweeping changes in the law.
A careful reading of the Arbitration Act would seem to
present only one interpretation which would lead to an un-
ambiguous result. That interpretation is, that where a case in-
volving an arbitration agreement is properly brought into the
federal courts upon an independent federal question, the Ar-
bitration Act shall apply. Thus, if the contract involved af-
fects commerce or maritime transactions, the arbitration
agreement is to be "valid, irrevocable, and unenforceable"
only in cases wherein a federal question is contested. The Con-
gressional purpose underlying the Act, as enacted, means only
that in certain classes of federal cases, the common law rule of
revocability is not to be followed by the federal courts. Since
the Act itself does not confer independent jurisdiction, in
diversity cases, including those affecting commerce, the
state law should be applied by the federal courts unless their
jurisdiction rests upon an independent federal basis.
This result would accord with Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in the Bernhardt case and would contra-
dict no position taken in the majority opinion.39 Whether the
Act is treated as constituting procedure or substance, if its
application is thus limited, the problems of the interrelation-
ship of federal and state law are less difficult. On this ap-
proach Congress has not created generally applicable sub-
stantive law pre-empting state arbitration law. It has sought
to set forth the substantive federal law for enforcing arbitra-
tion agreements in certain classes of cases involving federal
questions.
This note does not attempt to expound the virtues or be-
labor the defects of the enforcement or non-enforcement of
arbitration agreements. What it does contend is that such
sweeping changes in both state and federal law should not be
brought about by placing a strained interpretation upon a
statute. If, as has been suggested, the Congressional intent
38. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 (1957).
39. See note 11, supra.
3531960]
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behind the Arbitration Act is presently favorable toward a
broad application of the Act, it may always achieve this re-
sult by an unambiguous statute to that effect. It is urged that
the courts should not read into the ambiguous terminology of,
the Act such far reaching changes in the law.
HARRY M. LIGHTSEY, JR.
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